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ABSTRACT ● Media Studies 2.0 seeks to rewire the discipline of media studies from prevailing notions of 
aggregate third-person, top-down or imposed identities (as found within the domain of industrial mass 
communications media) toward what it sees as the communication of new bottom-up, first-person or 
singular reflexive identities favored within the post-fordist, post-industrial spaces of the internet, social 
networking sites, second life-like domains and computer game spaces. This article will point toward 
many of the hidden, though still important, intersections between these two supposedly separate 
conceptions through the use of a case study that throws notions of clean “communication” into question. 
From this it will go on to argue for a recognition of such new media spaces as better conceptualized 
through Batailleʼs notion of ʻGeneral Economyʼ and Derridaʼs notion of ʻUndecidabilityʼ, as dually taken 
forward in the work of Arkady Plotnitsky. The conclusion? Far from modern teletechnologies offering a 
new sense of micro-community or as channels of individual self-expression (a new Rousseauian or 
McLuhanesque global village of intimate contact), these emergent teletechnologies serve to further 
displace or undecide the locus of any signature context of communication, which this article takes as a 
cause for celebration. ●  
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Introduction 
 
It is also said that different or distant places can  
communicate between each other by means  
of a given passageway or opening 
 Jacques Derrida, ʻSignature Event Contextʼ 
 
 For well over a decade now, the general shape of the object under media studiesʼ 
optic has been mutating with some notable rapidity. Some are consequently coming to ask 
whether the supervening academic study of this mutating object is itself in the best of shape 
to track such transformations. In response to these somewhat dissonant and lately heard 
notes, some reflexive recognition of these difficulties is in many places making itself apparent. 
Within one such example of this resonantly felt necessity, Gauntlett (Gauntlett 2004), in 
attempting to gain some theoretical traction on this currently surging and still somewhat 
protean “new media” landscape, believes that the still largely prevailing traditional linear or 
mass media based communications models are more and more providing a very poorly 
calibrated compass or orientation toward these new and emerging spaces. What of these 
mutating spaces?  
 Though somewhat haphazard at present, patterns are nevertheless forming either 
within the construction of more and more responsive third-party provided texts (e.g. television 
such as talent shows, computer games, certain websites, etc.) or first-party user-generated 
texts or smartefactsi (mobile ʻteleʼ interactions, social networking sites, responsive 
environments, youtube uploads etc.ii) and other still more protean forms of currently emerging 
practices that as yet have no shape (tracked for instance by Rheingold 2002 on a somewhat 
anthropological expedition to Tokyo, Japan). Along with his ongoing (Giddens inspired) 
reflexive-sociological work on media, culture and identity, Gauntlett provides a somewhat 
polemically-inspired manifesto approach that seeks to, in his words, rewire media studies to 
concentrate its energies and resources on these more widespread bottom-up participant 
creative spaces, rather than somewhat clumsily forcing tools tempered for a previous more 
top-down age, where formerly dominant media interestsiii produced one-way quite stage-
based and tightly controlled media spaces. In tackling the ageing, though still dominant, 
tendencies of existing media studies he points out that these have a manifest: 
 
[T]endency to celebrate certain ʻclassicʼ conventional and/or ʻavant-gardeʼ texts, and 
the focus on traditional media in general, is [within his proposed media studies 2.0] 
replaced with –or at least joined by- an interest in the massive ʻlong tailʼ of 
independent media projects such as those found on YouTube and many other 
websites, mobile devices, and other forms of DIY media. (Gauntlett, 2007)  
 
 These independent DIY media ʻprojectsʼ, on spaces such as Youtube, represent then 
the constructing or exhibiting of identities that would seem not to have been imposed from 
some large-scale third-person ʻwithoutʼ, but appear instead now to be self-driven excursions 
or ʻprojects-of-a-selfʼ, producing maps of its navigations through the complexities of the 
current social terrainiv. But these more personable spaces are also very hard to properly ʻpinʼ 
or nail down for study within currently dominant conceptualisations. For these emerging 
practices are operating along and across many confusedly staked media territorial or 
liminalised boundary lines and tracking this change is beginning to ʻfeelʼ really quite palpably 
difficult with current media analytic technologies. In answer to this and related difficulties, for 
Gauntlett and others (for instance Merrin 2006 and Jenkins 2008), a timely re-thinking of the 
disciplinary regime is of absolute necessity. The rewiring, reprogramming or urgent 
recalibrating of the superstructural instruments of a seeming abstract media studies is 
discordantly finding resonances within the concrete, and somewhat stressed, media 
educational institutional disciplinary apparatus: being pulled, so to speak, onto the rocks of 
these quite threatening techno-infrastructural global transformations that it cannot gauge. A 
new study vessel is needed; realignments clearly, even if lagging, then ʻwillʼ have to happen. 
The discipline must then listen closely and with a well-tempered ear for these rumbling 
ʻinternal dissonancesʼ if the analysing ʻtheoristvʼ is not to lose grasp of this disciplinary, 
somewhat morphous object that is actually also its own quite immediate institutional 
audience. In some agreement with Gauntlett, but concentrating also on this latter media 
educational audience, Merrin somewhat more confessionally (and in the borrowed rhetorical 
language of the creation myth) speaks of a sort of decisive moment, of a momentous 
epiphany, when he first realised the changing shape of his own disciplineʼs dual objects: 
 
Between my childhood media world and my sonʼs there is a chasm. My sonʼs world is 
also my studentʼs world. I realised this a few years ago when a student came to see 
me about their essay and handed me a USB memory stick – the first Iʼd ever seen 
[…]. It brought home the absurdity of being a media studies lecturer when your 
students know more about the media than you do. We know the discipline and the 
texts, ideas and the arguments but our students surpass us in their knowledge, use 
and navigation of the contemporary media world: they are at home in it. (Merrin, 
2007) 
 
  There is a strong sense here then of a precariously borrowed time for the currently 
operating media theory and a need to urgently ʻactʼ before completely losing any sense of 
scholastic timeliness. Gauntlett and Merrin point out that although then the shape and detail of 
these responsive ʻsmartefactsʼ are undergoing rapid change (indeed dizzying intra and inter-
boundary transformations that have yet really to settle into a formulariseable stability), a clear 
pattern is nevertheless forming that makes the necessity of the clarion call for a significant 
paradigm shift or a renewal of Media Studies clear enough for us to hear. And to further 
amplify the resonant power of this clarion-call, both have independentlyvi (and both somewhat 
polemically) proposed this call-to-arms be called “Media Studies 2.0”; giving a clear 
eschatological signpost to those of us still left a little too far behind. By the application of such 
a 2.0 digital-integer appellation, the game can be shown to have really changed out of all “1.0” 
recognition. There can thus be no pre-integer incremental “*.5” (or ʻfloatingʼ point) release for 
this update or “rewiring” (Gauntlett, 2004) and certainly no fine adjusting or fudging of any 
existent “1.*” top-down too ideological state apparatus-based outlookvii. Let us look in a little 
more detail at Gauntlettʼs own particular flavour of the 2.0 iteration. 
 
 
1. The stage divide(s): iterating the differences 
 
In order to see more evidently what this digital switchover might ʻtheoreticallyʼ entail 
and to more clearly signpost the significant differences between a proposed “2.0” and its 
(retroactivated) “1.0” oppositional ʻotherʼ, we will take Gauntlettʼs own Butlerian concept 
(Gauntlett, 2008)viii and use this as an ambit or orbit around which to tease out some of these 
supposed key differences: first person stage-crossing reflexivity or ʻPerformativityʼ versus a 
third-person stage-based or theatrical pre-reflexive ʻConstativityʼ. For Gauntlett and many 
others at the present time, these Austinian terms (Austin, 1975) form a highly influential 
framework that, specifically for him, helps clarify some of the key differences in approach 
(from the previously dominant and now mishandling, as we have seen, ʻ1.0ʼ). As we will later 
see in more detail, notions of performativity proved to be very important within a theoretically 
rich section of the disciplinary field of gender studies (Butler, 1990, 1993 & 1997 as well as 
Sedgwick, 2003) for pointing to the unfinished or relatively open nature of gender 
performances (in relation to a notionally “natural”, “prior” or “given” sex). Gauntlett, as we will 
later see, reworksix Butler to provide an idea of personaliseable spaces wherein ʻanʼ identity 
can reflexively play with a less and less given or generalisable identity, an identity that is not 
then, in itself, either solidified or finalx: 
 
The internetʼs scope for anonymous interaction, and therefore identity play, is 
significant for the way in which it fits in with contemporary queer theory. Queer theory 
suggests that people do not have a fixed essence, and that identity is a performance 
(Butler 1990a; www.theory.org.uk/queer). We may be so used to inhabiting one 
ʻidentityʼ that it seems natural to us, but itʼs a kind of performance nonetheless. 
(Gauntlett, 2004) 
 
 So much for the monadic individual, but what of the constitution of spaces where 
identity is deployed or externally activated? Again these spaces or stages, where such 
performances take place, are changing also. As well as in gender studies, performativity has 
also proved to be influential as a concept within the more obvious domain of performance 
studies where it has helped in conceptually framing the equally open nature of contemporary 
dramatic “simulation”, complicating a previously taken-for-granted “supplementary” or 
“parasitic moment” of more traditional forms of theatrical ʻrepresentationʼ (see for example 
Phelan and Lane, 1998). This previously dominant ʻparasiticʼ moment or stage-citation, that 
was the framed and ʻfinished playʼ, now comes to bleed over, as performances connect up to 
worlds beyond the constative confines of such stage-based divides (in a sense quite similar to 
the never-finalised liveliness of Artaudʼs ʻtheatre of crueltyʼ). Such spaces are no longer 
carved off or apart from the world, as we shall later see complicated, but form a sort of 
Goffmanesque extension of the performative act that makes of the world a stage and of the 
stage a world. Leaving these spatial-bleeds aside for the time being, it must be pointed out 
that while ʻperformativityʼ is certainly of undoubted key importance within a number of 
domains, we will argue in the next section that the particular flavour of performativity that 
Gauntlett works with is perhaps a little questionable within its reading of the concept, as well 
as, more importantly, being questionable as a key operational lever or guarantor for his own 
particular problematic. 
 
 
1.2 Gauntlettʼs issues with 1.0 media  
and their immanent 1.0 study 
One of Gauntlettʼs main issues with the use of the prevailing modelling of media 
studies is that it tends to adopt an inappropriately pre-reflexive or pre-performative reading of 
the contemporary userʼs relation to their media: views which were not only methodologically 
questionable within their prior incarnations within the previously dominant linear-industrial 
media exemplified by a top-down novel, radio or television apparatus (for example in his 
arguing for a conception of semantically active audiences in ʻTV Living: Television, Culture 
and Everyday Lifeʼ as opposed to the hypodermic readings of these apparatus theorists) but 
which today are positively anachronous as audiences now literally step over the dividing lines 
of their variously positioned ʻstagesʼ and have thus become highly active hyperexpansive-
diegetic performersxi or actors in their own right. Thus there is a sort of double-outdatedness 
to these outmoded 1.0 hypodermic or apparatus conceptualisations. From previously arguing, 
at one remove, then from a position of defending ʻsemanticallyʼ active audiences within their 
various ʻuses and gratificationsʼ of old linear 1.0 media, the proposed Media Studies 2.0 
argues from a powerfully-positioned second remove (from this anachronous 1.0): that a more 
radical ʻsyntacticallyʼ and performatively active audience is now quite literally ʻatʼ play with 
their hyper-expansive texts (rather than tragically or machinically ʻcaughtʼ within them like 
some robotic “Hamlet on the Holodeck” playing a still tethered narratological game).  
Any valid conceptualising work on new media then should abandon old third-person 
constative models and spaces and theoretically realign itself to these more operant or 
generative first-person performative models and spaces. What then, we may ask, is the 
relation between these two genres of media space? For Gauntlett it is clear that these 
differently positioned spaces match up to a surrounding social world of 1) a departing 
industrially ʻreproductiveʼ space versus 2) an entering and now dominant post-fordist 
ʻresponsiveʼ individualised space. Enclosing this within a schematic oppositional table might 
help us to establish some of the key totemic differences to orient us further: 
 
 
Media (/Studies) 1.0 Media (/Studies) 2.0 
Closed texts 
stage divided but semantically playful 
 Open texts  
      stage erased and “syntactically” playful 
Top-down 
paternalist, cultura/colere 
Bottom-up  
autonomist, subculture/ʼanarculturalʼ 
Third-person 
past participle: citational “echo” 
First-person  
present participle: experiential “origin” 
Constative 
pre-reflexive 
Performative 
reflexive immanence 
Industrial 
does not ʻtake-a-standʼ on its being = 
“fixed identity” 
Post-fordist 
does take a stand on its being=  
“hyper-identity” 
  
In general then, within a move from the left-hand column to the right, we will progress 
from a centrally organised or centripetal state-provisional space of national third-person 
“subjecthood” (as exemplified and symbolically supported by nationally inclined media 
broadcasters such as the Britainʼs BBC) toward an untethered more centrifugal space of 
cosmopolitan free reflexive “individualism” where such prior lifelong subjecthoods (Giddens, 
1991) that accompanied the fordist industrial age now decrease in volume, to be replaced by 
local-personally centred interests that tend to transcend such prior national interests 
(exemplified for example by internet tele-communities untied to geo-locality): something, that 
the traditional ʻendsʼ of television, would seem not to be able to reach. The constative 
imposition of a previously dominant external framework seems to loosen here then to a first-
person interiority of reflexive self-driven interests. How does first-person performativity then 
operate exactly? 
 
 
2. First-personhood: reflexive performativity 
 
According to Austin a constative utterancexii sits above or describes its particular 
ʻobjectʼ from an external position; as a sort of third-person agency placed ʻoutsideʼ of an 
action that is presumed ʻinʼ itself to be internal ʻtoʼ itself (i.e. “it is raining” describes something 
external to the statement being made). In media productive terms this takes the form of an 
external (temporal-spatial) reporting of a prior or ideally independent “EVENT” that does not 
cross over from the other side of the stage divide to become an active part of the reporting 
performance itself (e.g. that subject-1 comments on object-1; subject-2 listens to report on 
object-1 from subject-1: by keeping subjects and objects in this sense separate, we will not 
mix up the reporting on the rain for making or causing the rain!). In terms of such an important 
canonical separation of the functional spaces, and taking the differing actions of running and 
apologising as illustrative examples, Austin points out that: 
 
This difference is marked in English by the use of the non-continuous present in 
performative formulas […] We might say: in ordinary cases, for example running, it is 
the fact that he is running that makes the statement that he is running true; or again, 
that the truth of the constative utterance ʻhe is runningʼ depends on his being running. 
Whereas in our case it is the happiness of the performative ʻI apologiseʼ which makes 
it the fact that I am apologising: and my success in apologising depends on the 
happiness of the performative utterance ʻI apologiseʼ. This is one way in which we 
might justify the ʻperformative-constativeʼ distinction -as a distinction between doing 
and saying. (Austin, 1975, p.47) 
  
A report then (that someone is presently performing a ʻrunʼ) depends upon the truth-
verifiable reporting of a notionally fixed, past-participle, pre-reflexivexiii event-capture or ʻframeʼ 
that is perfectly external to the reported upon phenomena, in a fashion very similar to an 
optical apparatus involved in observing any phenomena of the discipline of physics. This 
apparatus should clearly be external to and not implicated within the constitution of the 
phenomena that its (peer reviewable) observer is presently involved in examining. This 
ʻreporting-of-realityʼ should certainly not then be performatively implicated in ʻbeing-a-part-ofʼ 
that from which it should adequately take its distance.  
In this last regard, we will examine later in the important theoretical work of Arkady 
Plotnitsky (work that could certainly be of benefit to a media studies involved in examining 
complexly-interactive media phenomena) the further difficulties of any supposedly clean 
ʻconstative constitutionʼ, where object-relations are always-already performatively refracted 
within the ʻinterestʼ or the ʻperformative appropriationʼ of a ʻlocalisedʼ or ʻgraphicʼ economyxiv.  
Although this takes us a little further into the argument than is required at this time, I would 
like the reader to keep hold of the problem that constative reportingxv distance is always 
involved within a performative effect on what it is observingxvi. 
 For now however, as something then notionally ʻseparableʼ from the account and 
thus externally third-person positional in ʻnatureʼ, these reports or mediations of the external 
event can be ideally tackled or verified on the grounds of some teleological approximation to a 
criterion such as ʻtruthʼ.  In terms of linear 1.0 pre-reflexive media, and in being ʻfixedʼ and 
ʻthird-personʼ in nature, they tend to tether and aggregate identity into unresponsive 
categorical complexes (audiences). In a ʻprogressiveʼ response then to this former 
aggregational accounting, new and emergent 2.0 media on the contrary plastically co-respond 
and are available for either first-personxvii ʻmalleabilityʼ (the internet, computer games, etc.) or 
first-person singular ʻgenerationʼ (youtube, social networking, etc.).  
Clearly here within the age of 2.0 media we seem to have something akin to Austinʼs 
interior-ʻdoingʼ (“I apologise”) rather than external-ʻsayingʼ (“he is running”). Such, similarly, 
are the knotted series of narratological ideals discussed famously in Janet Murrayʼs 
paradigmatic bookxviii on virtual reality narrative called ʻHamlet on the Holodeckʼ that saw an 
age soon to come that would finallyxix involve an audience making the ʻstepʼ over the 
threshold from being an audiencexx for a prior screened ʻplayʼ to being existentially bound up 
as reflexively implicated actors involved in the first-person active constitution of hyper-
narrational space-time eventsxxi. In sympathy with Murrayʼs democratic optimism of 
participationxxii in what were previously imposed by the one-way traffic of stories, Jenkins 
points to increasing first-person performative participation within stories ʻwrittenʼ more in 
unison with the “providers”: 
 
I will argue here against the idea that convergence should be understood primarily as 
a technological process bringing together multiple media functions with the same 
devices. Instead, convergence represents a cultural shift as consumers are 
encouraged to seek out new information and make connections amongst dispersed 
media content. This book is about the work -and play- spectators perform in the new 
media system. The term, participatory culture, contrasts with older notions of passive 
media spectatorship. Rather than talking about media producers and consumers as 
occupying separate roles, we might now see them as participants who interact with 
each other according to a new set of rules that none of us fully understands. 
(Jenkins 2008, p.3) 
 
Thus “audiences”xxiii are now participants, and are more and more moving on to direct 
their own more playful playsxxiv and have thus moved significantly on from the merely 
ʻmentallyʼ responsive semantic-symbolic play of yore to an active, performative and 
generative ʻindexical-motilityʼ; a syntactically playful transformational plasticity that serves 
their own local concerns rather than the more normative or formative concerns of an 
aggregated and distant majority. This significant move within media apparatuses across the 
previously constituted stage-divide (separated from their ʻownʼ-ʻlocalʼ-ʻrealʼ interests) is, as we 
saw Giddens-through-Gauntlett point out earlier, symptomatic of larger shifts within the more 
generalised social soil (or base/infrastructure, to use the classical Marxist spatial metaphor). 
In sympathy with Jenkins, Gauntlett (explicitly after Giddens, 1991) points out that identity is 
now no longer to be handed-down from an unassailably assigned top-down position, but now 
arrives from an active, reflexive and highly malleable ʻselfʼ that involves itself in temporary 
creative projectsxxv and so is not any longer located on the right frequency to receive the 
organisational or regimented calls or hailings of an outdated fordist industrial mass media 
apparatus (here the superstructure would be lagging behind a move within the constitution of 
the base, just as a 1.0 media studies lags behind its students).  
This new media highly interactive ʻobject-spaceʼ and the media studies 2.0 ʻopticʼ 
upon that object forms an intimate tripartite linkage with a famous and larger ongoing 
sociological debate around neo-fordist processes and techniquesxxvi of flexible identities 
logically transposed or extended back into the quite contiguous or immanent realm media 
studiesxxvii. Of this performative or reflexive relation of the previously distanced optic to object, 
Giddens somewhat programmatically points out that: 
 
Such writings [ʻSecond Chancesʼ by Wallerstein and Blakeslee] are part of the 
reflexivity of modernity: they serve routinely to organise, and alter, the aspects of 
social life they report on or analyse. Anyone who contemplates marriage today, or 
who faces a situation of the break-up of a marriage or a longterm intimate 
relationship, knows a great deal (not always on the level of discursive awareness) 
about what is going on in the social arena of marriage and divorce. Such is not 
incidental to what is actually going on, but constitutive of it –as is true of all contexts 
of social life in conditions of modernity […] Each of us not only has, but lives a 
biography reflexively organised in terms of flows of social and psychological 
information about possible ways of life. (Giddens, 1991, p14) 
 
In appreciation of Giddensʼ point of view Gauntlett points out that:  
 
Giddens is fascinated by the growing amounts of reflexivity in all aspects of society, 
from formal government at one end of the scale to intimate sexual relationships at the 
other […]. Doing things just because people did them in the past is – is the opposite 
of modern reflexivity. (Gauntlett, 2002, p97) 
 
Thus reflexivity within the present stage of modernity is constituted by a keen self-
awareness that performativelyxxviii unites actor ʻimmanentlyʼ with the apparatuses that they are 
bound up with and not as third-person subjects of something that previously came before 
them on the opposite side of a stage (in a sort of play that they were merely reflex characters 
within). Reflexivity here then gives the sense of someone ahead of a game they are 
nonetheless immanently caught up in playing. Modernity according to Giddens then 
reflexively tools-up the modern social actor to self-direct their own temporary performative 
ʻplaysʼ. It must be said here that we do not agree with either of these readings of reflexivity 
(especially of the rather tautologous-individualist flavour favoured by Gauntlett), so we will 
now visit some these difficulties with performativity before arriving at some other ways of 
reading these changes within the individual-media interface. Following a genealogical thread 
back to Austinʼs origination of performativity we will find some key contradictions that do 
indeed prepare the way for such readings (of a relatively pure groundless-figural relationship) 
but which miss out on the subsequent deconstructive moves that Butler and Derrida make to 
exhibit (and then productively use) these contradictions; clarifying thus the rather thorny 
status of ʻcausal-agencyʼ within the modern reflexive social ʻgameʼ. These issues within the 
conceptual framework of classical performativity will then help us toward unpacking some of 
Gauntlettʼs problems with framing these as singular or atomic ʻlivedʼ events, which we will 
then go on to question with our own Derridean inspired performative (within our main case-
study in section 3). The following section is necessary then to complicate the concept of 
reflexivity and performativity to be ready to tease out some of the paradoxes of the 
performative within that section following. 
 
 
2.1 Performative contradictions:  
haunted by constatives and vice versa 
 
For Austin, it is true that performativity was a much anguished over conceptxxix. There 
are problems with the use of performativity that Austin himself pointed towards and which 
caused him to constantly refine his apparatus (without however managing to totally jettison its 
sticking points). As we stated earlier, performative utterances are speech acts that perform an 
act in the very act or occasion of their saying, as opposed to constative utterances, which 
merely recite or relate a state of affairs distantly external to and ʻcausallyʼ divisible from 
themselves. The latter then is ideally merely the dead citational or recorded echo of a 
previous state of affairs (the truth or falsity of which being thus arguable, even if perhaps 
infinitely postponed), while the performative ʻactionsʼ or ʻaccomplishesʼ something, 
making either the truth or falsity of a judgement entirely erroneous or externalxxx to the 
veracity of the act: it simply, self-sufficiently and internally ʻisʼxxxi. To take one of Austinʼs 
famous examples and coincidentally echoing a little, some of the modern difficultiesxxxii with 
marriage that Giddens makes above: “I do” is a performative utterance of force, the 
inarguablexxxiii consequence of which, is that it actions-commits the agency to an ʻimmanentlyʼ 
occurring course of action within the very same immediate and simultaneous present (within 
marriage ceremonies, within court cases, within the enactment of street bets, etc.) These 
various “I doʼs” ʻverbʼ doubly in the sense of both speech and indivisibly as action).  
To recapitulate before developing: as a first-person immanent process then, the 
performative (speech) act is conceptualised by Austin as a self-present, freestanding 
substance or self-standing atomicxxxiv ʻthingʼ; a thing that una-void-ably folds or unites both 
words and deeds under one powerfully indivisible atomic roof.  
 
 
2.2: Derridaʼs move: internally riven performatives 
 
Taking this very influential model of generative action (or ʻordinary languageʼ) as 
another typical figure of the metaphysics of ʻself-presenceʼ, Derrida (Derrida, 1998) (and later 
carried further by Butler within the field of ʻgender studiesʼxxxv) problematised this opposition 
by pointing out that Austinʼs theory (while wishing to establish the address or the indubitable 
coordinates of ʻillocutionary forceʼ as the immovable boiled-down or ʻeconomically reducedʼ 
immovable ground of the performative) unavoidably undermines its own claims of oppositional 
cleanliness through the irresolvable problem of the sustainability of a supposedly singular 
intentional act that would nevertheless still need much more than ʻitselfʼ ʻto beʼ itself (in an 
ana-logous sense to Husserlʼs difficulty of positing an internal intentional ʻexpressionʼ clean of 
external denotational ʻindicationʼxxxvi). Derrida points out that the illocutionary-performative is 
always already operating within a traced, marked or iterative (pre-existing, though differing) 
network or context beyond its own supposed sovereign or majesticxxxvii immediacy. Indeed, 
Austin cannot help but say (though representationally-repressed as mere niggling marginalia) 
as much himselfxxxviii. The intention, within the doing, is not a freestanding atomic entity; the 
performative is thus not purely ʻperformativeʼ! 
 Derrida then goes on to re-function, re-mobilise or re-direct this now internally 
problematised ʻperformativeʼ term and use it (sous-raturexxxix) within his own more 
disseminativexl theoretical apparatus. He has then at his disposal a re-coined performative 
internally and immanently marked, traced or riven by a third-person contextual constative 
(which one could economically re-house under a portmanteau word such as 
ʻiteratoperformativeʼxli). It is important to point out however that Derrida is only more ʻopenlyʼ-
opening a ʻdehiscenceʼ within the supposedly safe or closed oppositional framework that was 
itself always already internally riven, traced, traversed or somewhat en-crypt-ically “archived” 
by such compound difficulties. It is this quite suspicious ʻre-workingʼ then that we intend to 
utilise here as a lever into some difficulties with Gauntlettʼs use of reflexivity and performativity 
and the supposed first-person activities of these now actively self-present stage-crossing 
signature-bearing audiences. 
 
 
2.3 iMediation: iLocation iLegality iLlocution 
 
In problematising then this 1.0 versus 2.0 model, rather than these so-called 2.0 ʻfirst-
personʼ new media offering a clean move across (from our left-hand to right-hand tabled 
entries in section 1) from the previously dominant top-down, re-citational, paternalist, super-
egoistic, ʻthough-mustʼ of some industrial paternalist-programming environment, the 
performative actions of these so-called first person media cannot themselves help but take 
their place upon a prior-existing context or ground outside of their own supposedly now free 
and sovereign performative acts or actions. As we will see within our case study in section 3, 
any notional intentionalist performative needs far more than the sovereign internality it wishes 
to circumscribe for itself. To underline the problem of the lived supposedly circumscribed 
ʻmonadʼ, Derrida uses the famous time-shifted indivisible representative-of-the-self (according 
to Austin) that is the signing-signed-signaturexlii; ʻtheʼ supposed self-standing intentional 
source, guarantor or integrator of author-ity: 
 
Not only does Austin not doubt that the source of an oral utterance in the present 
indicative active is ʻpresentʼ to the utterance [enunciation] and its statement [enonce] 
[…] but he does not even doubt that the equivalent to this tie to the source utterance 
is simply evident and assured by a signature […] in the transcendental form of a 
presentness [maintenance]. That general maintenance is in some way inscribed, 
pinpointed in the always evident and singular punctuality of the form of the signature. 
Such is the enigmatic originality of every paraph. In order for the tethering to source 
to occur what must be retained is the absolute singularity of a signature-event and a 
signature-form: the pure reproducibility of a pure event. Is there such a thing? Does 
the absolute singularity of signature as event ever occur? [my signature 
emphasis, T.R.] Are there signatures? 
(Derrida 1977, p11) 
 
While hardly doubting the empirical functioning or the pragmatic everydayness of the 
signature as event, Derrida goes on to point toward the signatureʼs somewhat impossible, 
aporetic and inherently divided “position”: 
 
Effects [my emphasis] of signatures are the most common thing in the world. But the 
condition of possibility of those effects is simultaneously, once again, the condition of 
their impossibility, of the impossibility of their rigorous purity. In order to function, that 
is, to be readable, a signature must have a repeatable, iterable, imitable form; it must 
be able to be detached from the present and the singular intention of its production. It 
is its sameness which, by corrupting its identity and its singularity, divides its seal 
[sceau]. 
(Ibid. p.11) 
 
According to Derrida then, the internal-integral-integrity of the stamp or signature-seal 
is already imminently and immanently problematic and does not thus await any errant 
agency or alterity to tamper with its privately held ʻpropertiesʼ. There always-already 
has-to-be an internal-external or determinable-interminable repetition; conventional markings; 
contexts; or archival mechanisms, for a signature at all “to-be” (Être) or for an event to ever 
occur or ʻcountʼxliii as such, but (and this should intra-echo to/from section 3.3 where we talk 
about the problem of prosthetic-directions), in a symmetrical reverse and highly problematic 
joint reciprocal process, any prior context is always unstable and cannot thus guarantee in 
advance any clean receptivity for the recording or registration of the already problematised 
singularity (of any incoming signature/event or signature-event). One cannot transport the 
essence or the ʻsoulʼ of oneʼs signature-ʻsignatureʼ, but equally, the signature is never 
itself, any earlier than this, a soul-sovereign ʻthingʼ.  
Although this may seem a rather unnecessarily lofty (perhaps even a rather dry) 
discussion, models of communication (even the most modern and seemingly less linearly-
inclined, least ʻprocessʼ based ones) tend to ignore or conveniently brush aside this inherent 
and unavoidable instability within any notional trans-portation of ʻmeaningʼ (both in the sense 
of ʻcontainedʼ or indicative meaning and the ʻillocutionary forceʼ or the expressivexliv meaning-
to-say, presumed prosthetically ʻcapturableʼ in repetition-mechanical or otherwise). This will 
form the nub of our argument in studying new media in section 3.* below. 
This quite simple re-inscription of the problematic displacement of the singular, the 
self-sufficient and self-generating monadic atom with its self-possessed or professing-
accountable qualiaxlv (whether that be either the self-enclosed micro-sovereign-self of first-
person 2.0 or the larger but still self-enclosed macro-nation-state of third-person 1.0 media 
that is much more internally-riven-by-exteriority than it-itself overtly thinksxlvi), will have some 
far reaching implications, as Butler will go on to argue with this problematised immanent-
dehiscence of the intentional performative.  
Butler is concerned here with the very operation of the sex and gender border divide 
(where the former would ʻpresumablyʼ be a scientific third-person ʻconstativeʼ to the latterʼs 
more operant first-person lived or socialised ʻperformativeʼ). But, according to Butler, sex is 
never simply something easily or materially ʻgiven-overʼ in some clean transportation from the 
dressing-room or antechamber of the womb to being presented upon the main-stage that is 
the wombʼs objective outside, but is inherently destabilised by any receiving or greeting 
ʻcontextʼxlvii. For there is always-after-all a nervous or secondary-pregnant moment of difficulty 
contained within the awaiting of the equally-pregnant-though-seemingly transparent-
interpellation or binary pronouncement that: “itʼs a boy!” that is always-already threatened by 
that which might fall liminally-outside of it). Taking an obvious exception to this normally 
untroubledxlviii and untroubling norm Butler speaks of an inevitable dehiscent ʻharryingʼ of 
such a seemingly easy biologised norm: 
  
Is it not a purely cultural convention to which Page and others refer when they decide 
that an anatomically ambiguous XX individual is male, a convention that takes 
genitalia to be the definitive ʻsignʼ of sex? […]. The point here is not to seek recourse 
to the exceptions, the bizarre, in order merely to relativize the claims made on behalf 
of normal sexual life. As Freud suggests in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 
however, it is the exception, the strange, that gives us the clue to how the mundane 
and taken-for-granted world of sexual meanings is constituted. Only from a self-
consciously denaturalized position can we see how the appearance of naturalness is 
itself constituted. (Butler, 2006, p. 149) 
 
Thus any pre-baptismal but nevertheless ʻbaptismalʼ performance of the performative of the 
pregnantly-awaited interpellation: “itʼs a boy!”xlix, always finds itself chased by an unavoidable 
or spectral other-possibility that nevertheless, somewhat hauntologically, lends it its very own 
integral dueness.  
 Before finally arriving at some more decisive theoretical conclusions for such ʻun-
decidabilityʼ within these performative/constative inhering contradictions that Derrida and 
Butler point out, I wish to turn for a time from these theoretical abstractions toward a more 
immanent and concrete case study to illustrate such aporetic problematics of the performative 
and in placing of ʻanyʼ signature or act. This case study will form the foundation for a 
conclusion that proposes a theory based less on certainty, than in recognising the 
inherently uncertain “nature” of these teletechnological stages. 
 
 
3.1  The aporetic stage(s) of tele-presence   
  
 This section provides the preceding argument with a case-study or a relatively 
concrete example of the current tendency of teletechnologies operating “interactively” across 
borders, which demonstrates I hope to show, some of the inherent complications in 
conceiving such “communications” (for ““communications”“ should not be employed as some 
semantically innocent byword for the transportation of information, but as something involving 
highly differentiated and also quite pragmatically embodied powers) as mere extensions 
across an expanse of space-time. Here, as we hope to show through this sectionʼs main 
example of a performative internet communication, there can be no digital fulfilment of 
McLuhanʼs global villagel; a culmination that would finally vanquish the barrier or the border 
within the simultaneous act of crossing of it (or perhaps to the contrary: that such borders 
return already-again to haunt these very cross-border acts). Such cross-border acts, as we 
hope to show, are something far from a mere stepping over, with the help of some extending 
digital prosthesis, and so are not the culmination of some of televisionʼs endsli.  
 Our example here involves the highly practical and practible affair of hunting real 
animals across an internet connection, the aim of which is that one can tele-presently or 
teletechnologically hunt in a place where it is legal to kill, but from a place where it is not, via 
the tele-portation or tele-transportation possibilities of internet connectivity. But far from this 
being some simple step outside of the restrictive platonic cave of “representation” into some 
cyberspatial real (as the inventor or provider of this proposed service inherently supposed), 
this simple neoliberal entrepreneurial act provides us with a very concrete example of the 
difficulties of place and topography haunting the supposedly clear communicative scene of 
John Perry Barlowʼslii hoped for independence of the notionally unifiedliii space of cyberspace. 
In the year 2005 a native Texan, one John Underwood, bought himself a piece of 
Texan territory and planned to erect on this plot an expansive animal compound where 
distantly situated (prosthetically tele-present) huntersliv could fire at the very same animals 
that it would be illegal to hunt within their own presently embodied territories. Of Mr 
Underwoodʼs seemingly quite simple sovereign entrepreneurial actlv are born quite a number 
of issues and further abyssal difficulties that will tether us squarely into some important Media 
Studies 2.0lvi reflexive unsolvables, which reveal themselves when approaching closer some 
of the split ends of emergent teletechnologieslvii.  
It must be reinforced again finally, before substantially embarking on an analysis of 
this somewhat troubling example, that this study does not seek as its goal any resolution of 
the question or the problem of the extension of teletechnologies across borders, but that the 
very insolvability itself is our overriding focal interest. The aim here then is not to erect any 
final-theoretical framework of analysis that would legislate either for macro ʻnationalʼ (1.0) 
expression or micro ʻselfʼ (2.0) expression, but to point toward a further layer of difficulty that 
would not elide but foreground the undecidablity of any reading of (inter)actions within 
emergent teletechnolgies. This then will be our aim as we come out of this study: 
Communicative intentionality is not an easily transportable commodity, as intentionality itself 
does not exist as any simple object or objective of transportation. What then is the difficulty 
involved in constructing such a cross-territorial teletechnology that Mr. Underwood is 
embarking upon here? 
 
3.2 Mr. Underwoodʼs inter-territorial hunting engine   
 The ʻpracticalʼ process for constructing Mr. Underwoodʼs most helpful apparatus is 
itself quite simple. A rifle is mounted on a servomotor driven mount that is then in turn 
mounted by a camera-eye to help envision and thus then direct its territorial movements. This 
camera-eye or video technology (analogous somewhat to those video-conferencing 
teletechnologies which unproblematically bring people from geometrically separate or ʻforeignʼ 
lands closer togetherlviii) then links across an internet connection to the final end-
user/consumer, who, through the adjustments of a sensorimotor driven control, moves the 
distantly placed rifle carefully around, following the tracks and traces of its tele-distinguished 
quarry, and, when ready, firing off a shot through the depressing of a mouse button or 
perhaps the trigger of some semiotically designed prostheticlix that reproduces the tactile feel 
of the more situated prosthetic that is the riflelx. After the trigger is pulled and the decision 
transmitted across the internet, the now deadened kill, at the other geo-distant ʻwetʼ or 
business-end, can then be optionally stuffed, mounted and sent “physically”lxi back to its 
distinguished hunter, along with an accompanying signed certificate of authenticity from one 
of Mr. Underwoodʼs witnesses placed at the coordinate-of-the-kill itself (who witnessing the 
skill so undoubtedly deployed, recorded and captured as evidence-by-proxy of this actorʼs 
intentional ʻstanding-reserveʼlxii). If we pause for thought we find a  reworking here of a quite 
classical model of communications “technology”. What then of such quite common 
technological recordings that would seem now to allow us to transport our intentions toward 
entities placed distantly across borders?  
Under classical conceptions, recording technologies store-up pre-existent live 
intentional acts (like the marks phonetic writing make that transcribe and transport an 
apparent prior-present speech) and through an indeterminate and perhaps even inordinate 
stretch of space-time, is finally freed or set-off upon its run within a ideally symmetric and 
effective or reinvigorated discharge that maps out, matches up to, the intentional expectations 
experienced at the time of the depositing of the original trace left upon the recording 
apparatus itself some perhaps inordinate time ago (a one-to-one, though shifted, mapping). 
Much as with Formula 1ʼs timeshifted KERS technology (Kinetic Energy Recovery System), 
the force, energy or charge is imprinted, deposited, saved or stored-up, to be cashed-in at 
some other ʻelsewhereʼ and ʻelsewhenʼ point in space-time. Nothing could apparently be more 
transparent, neutral or non-ideological than this ʻinput-storage-outputʼ model (the embalming-
unembalming hinted at in our title) self-enclosed reflexive cybernetically looped system.  
Taking this briefly sketched classical Cartesian model as a metaphorical piece of 
tracing paper to place over and recover Mr Underwoodʼs idea, we have the simple 
bootstrapping breach or broaching of the self-reflexive or self-generating performative act 
much like any supposed self-present intentional context-free speech act from the long 
western teleological traditionlxiii. It would seem to be nothing more, or in excess of, the 
recording-and-recovery of some pure quanta of intentionality (the classical Cartesian res 
cogitans), shot through, driven upon or pilotedlxiv along some neutral encapsulating telescopic 
physical embodiment or extension (the secondary Cartesian res extensa). Like some 
occupant of a SUV-Hummer vehicle, our intentionally deposited trace would seem to be able 
to survive any crash with a foreign boundary or figure-of-alterity. The foundations of our 
intention would seem to be left intact after such a border-crash. Again what of this classical 
conception of intentionality, that such border-crossings live off? We would seem to be able to 
say of such a self-generating or bootstrapping performative that: 
“[T]his mode of sovereignty functions as a foundationist event -also known as an 
explicit performative and a bootstrap performative- in which the act of referring to the 
event or thing actually creates the event or thing. This form of subjectivity is illustrated 
by many terms – the autological subject, the parvenu, the self-made man, die 
autonomie. […] The subject-in-love is experienced and understood like the self-
governing subject insofar as both are ideologically oriented to the fantasy of the 
foundational event…it is what exfoliates the social skin.    (Povinelli, 2003) 
In line with this reading of the supposedly ʻcausally intimate actʼ that Povinelli here outlines so 
well, we should not read Mr. Underwoodʼs apparatus as so easily parcelling up any clean 
intentional or cleanly performative “state”. We have situated here, I believe, a quite 
irresolvable, undecidable and haunting aporia that short-circuits such a ʻbootstrapʼ metaphor 
of the originary performative (of, for example, being unable absolutely to logistically or 
mathematically to fix the geometrical origin or position of the act ʻin-itselfʼ). To underline this 
impossible aporia of geo-metric and geo-graphic positioning we need to revisit Mr 
Underwoodʼs quite wonderful machine. 
If we go back around then to view this example we have to ask where and under what 
classical (Kantian) conditions of possibility does the shooting itself take place? If the aim of Mr 
Underwoodʼs well designed little schema is to allow for the killing of certain animalslxv within a 
domain where such killing is legal but from a domain where it is not, then where has the act 
taken place to be able to adjudicate upon its presence, absence or on its stable ontological 
value? Where exactly is the ʻplaceʼ of the act? When I am, as a hunter, placed within a place 
where it is illegal, I am not located within the place of the animal that it is illegal to kill, in the 
place that I amlxvi. I am also, of course, not indexically holding the gun that itself holds the 
bullets that would have the fingerprints of my signature-singularity placed upon them (at ʻtheʼ 
scene of a Locardianlxvii exchange) and taken away as evidence of an indexical imprint or 
coupled with a charge; recovered later as a just co-ordinate of my former presence. The 
ʻsmokingʼ gun is within our example, of course, somewhat problematically mounted and 
situated within a territory that is owned and within the purview of an owner (the context of 
Texas itself upon which Mr. Underwood underwrites or signs his rightful ownership of the gun 
and the right to hold it within his territorially situated compound) who is not I and is not where I 
am placed. Here then we have an important question that is altogether something more than 
a, perhaps, sophistic philosophical thought experiment: Where ʻwasʼ I at the time of the 
shooting? According to the traditional commonsense jurisdictional laws of intentional 
presence I (and my “body”) were most certainly placed within a place where it was illegal to 
shoot, but the shot was surely not shot ʻthereʼ, even if it may be argued later to have been 
shot ʻfromʼ there. Along these lines, but countering the ability of this last classical 
ʻintentionalistʼ rule to properly adjudicate or hold its ground(s), one may then subsequently 
counter-charge that the intentional act of an actor is to be placed within the place where it is 
illegal and so can be followed from the target ʻbackʼ (if that is the place?, and this is still very 
much the question) to the intentional-source and so be situated upon the solidity of the ground 
upon which the invigilating law itself should also co-presently stand (our decisional algorithm 
here being that the place of the -res cogitans- intentional act should be ʻextraditedʼ from the 
geographic ʻsiteʼ of the “physical” killing to the ʻlegislative territoryʼ of ʻmy-ownʼ occupied 
territory, where I should then be fit and able to presently stand trial). This topo- or tropo-
graphic groundinglxviii does not solve the still significant problem however that the animal was 
killed by a weapon ʻplacedʼ or situated within a distant legal space where it is perfectly legal to 
ʻperformʼ the killing. The performance was on another stage, even if directed from afar (mise-
en-scene). So where ʻhasʼ the animal died? Has it died within the “tele-present” (from-afar) 
illegal place or in a “physical-present place” (on-the-scene) where the killing of the thing itself 
is perfectly legal? Surely this too can be further complicated? Where, really, is where? 
To be impartial, let us flip this scenario. If the place of ʻintentionalityʼ is the present-
marker of the act, then what if the coin is reversed or placed in the other direction, as it were? 
What if in a space where it is ʻlegalʼ to kill, a button or trigger is depressed that extends a 
prosthesis electronically to a space where it is illegal to kill this same “naturalised”lxix animal? 
Surely one can then not be extradited (and brought to trial) from our intentional-legal space, 
given the setting up of such an intentional rule as the sorting or the archiving-rule? Because 
intentionality may have been adjudicated to be the presence-effect in one direction, it must 
surely be deemed acceptable that one must be able to “originate” or perform an intentional act 
on one stage, even if it bleeds-over, so to speak, into this other. Is there then an unequivocal 
or ʻdecidableʼ direction in either of these two directions? If not, then are we truly left within a 
sort of ʻactioning-limboʼ or on the undecidable edges of a paradox that can call for no final 
truce, synthesis, sublation or aufhebung? 
We are stuck or situated then on the porous-double-borders of a technological aporia 
and the uncertain site of an intimate and animate topographical crime that cannot be the 
actual mise-en-scene of a crime (within a readily available and easily identifiable pre-
technological territory). Such a geo-expansive tele-technology (and here we would take this 
local ontic example as tentative evidence of a larger ontological rule) does not then introduce 
any ʻcleanʼ and ʻpresentʼ extension of intentionality to just any indeterminate elsewhere or 
anywhere and is then not a clean or ideal intentional/performative act upholding mechanism.  
 
 
 
3.3 Decisive decisions:  on the prosthetic compass effect 
 
To enact the ʻdecisionʼ we are forced to take on deciding the place of the act we have 
been describing here in some detail, one must mystically reboot what I would propose to call 
the ʻprosthetic compass-effectʼ, by performing what is called within legislative circles a 
ʻbootstrap doctrineʼlxx; a sort of fresh doctrinal decision on the scope of the space of 
jurisdiction, which nevertheless comes upon some countervailing borders even if that 
doctrine, effect or reboot is not concretely contested by any empirical party. For the necessity 
of such a ʻmystical reboot' bears witness to the stage of an aporetic ʻscenic crimeʼ or more 
properly of an aporetically criminal ʻscenarioʼ. Through the illustration of this case study, I 
believe, any model of a performatively secure sovereign actor acting reflexively on the 
innocent other side of the projected other end of 1.0 mediaʼs third-person constative 
boundedness (taking a nationally interested television as an obvious example of this latter 
form of boundary) cannot use reflexivity or classical performativity (of the relatively pure 
species suggested by Austin and handed down to Gauntlett) as its fixed and certain alibi. For 
the act cannot be adjudicated on the basis of a decisional tending to the actorʼs own lived 
event: for the supposedly lived act is in its very self (if one can still use that word) intimately 
divided.  
Though any concrete or ontically exampled “performative” act may not decidedly act 
or be unproblematically shown to stand on either territory or groundlxxi (in Texas or wherever 
else) it certainly cannot stand upon its ownmost own performative or signature ground either. 
It does not in any event “transplant” or “transport” itself across some seemingly antiseptic 
embalming technology and be transported in a ʻjust-soʼ manner merely ʻout-thereʼ, to then be 
(later) unembalmed, rehydrated or resuscitated as some prior uncontaminated signature ʻactʼ. 
Here (/there) is where the logic of the undecidablelxxii disrupts any presence of place: as 
objective place, or more importantly for our present argument as a subjectively intended act. 
This form of subjectivity is at the centre of performative-reflexive theories such as media 
studies 2.0 and in the next section we will see why we must add Derridean undecidablitylxxiii to 
bring to light a little more of this prosthetic compass effect that we believe these media to 
exemplify. 
 
 
4.1  In/Conclusion - Closing the border(s):  
the common-thread(s) of 1.0 and 2.0 
 
I am able to be both here (in L.A.) and there (in Dallas), both then (1963) and now 
(2002), but I am always present, moving, live, in command […] If early television 
promised to bring us the world, on the Web, our own volition in relation to this travel 
gets foregrounded. Microsoft asks, ʻWhere do you want to go today?ʼ. (Mcpherson, 
2004) 
 
 Here, according to Mcpherson, there is a teleological promise within emergent 
teletechnologies that extends the reach of early televisionʼs ʻliveʼ and ʻlivedʼ ontological 
promise (after Feuer) and where the new would bring to fruition the voyages and dreams of 
the old. The concrete borders of the media have moved (in the sense that they are now 
performative and interactive) but they nevertheless partake of the same ʻsovereignʼ and 
ʻsanctifiedʼ ground of a desire for completion. If we revisit the column from earlier and zoom 
out a little, we can perhaps see some telling continuities between the conceptions of both 1.0 
and 2.0 in terms of their dual adherence to borders and their formative protection of what one 
could conceptualise, after Derrida, as the desire for the ʻownmostʼ. For both iterationslxxiv place 
a border around an identity that would ward-off what impeaches its rule. The right-hand 
column provides a list of entities that the left would like to do without but which haunt 
nevertheless as an uncanny visitor already in residence. The question of degree remains 
perhaps: do these modern teletechnologies move further inland, within some “safer” borders? 
We would have to answer yes in current iterations of media studies 2.0 of the flavour of 
Merrinʼs and especially of Gauntlettʼs. The final section provides some sketches toward a 
conception that would put the emphasis more openly on this right-hand column. 
 
 
Both 1.0 & 2.0 Their Other 
Prediction Alea 
Mastery Alterity 
Veracity Unexpected 
Arché  
  (monad/qualia: “signature”/”event”) 
An-arché   
(“divided seal”) 
Hostility to chance Hospitality to chance 
 
 
4.2 The prestige of representation or renewable 
energetics: embalmed, unembalmed, undecidable. 
 
 In a very impressive book ʻComplementarity: Anti-epistemology After Bohr and 
Derridaʼ, in a chapter titled ʻThe Age of Quantum Mechanical Reproductionʼ Arkady Plotnitsky 
writes: 
 
This loss in presence make the quantum theoretical economy a general economy and 
the efficacity at issue analogous to Derridean alterity-efficacity which “makes us 
concerned not with horizons of modified –past or future- present, but with a ʻpastʼ that 
has never been present, and which never will be, whose future to come [lʼ ʻa-venirʼ] 
will never be a production or reproduction in the form of presence” (Derrida, Margins, 
21). There are only ʻphotographsʼ, which would have to be described as always –
always already- taken too late to allow one to describe or even to speak of a reality 
behind quantum phenomena. These phenomena are always incomplete and, from the 
classical point of view, contradictory. (Plotnitsky 1994, p.105) 
 
Like these problematic uni-conceptions of a ʻpresenceʼ, notions of reflexivity and first-
person performativity (as key nodal points within Media Studies 2.0ʼs arsenal) are inadequate 
to the task of ʻrecordingʼ both the decision and the act that arises from the problem of the 
decision we exemplified within section 3.1. The purpose of this ontical or regional example, 
has been to map out some of the difficulties involved in tracing out any narrowcast topology or 
ontology. We are faced more with a map that depicts more (im)properly, a hauntologylxxv of 
the act. By being unable to resolve this ontically immanent and regional act into either a 
ʻlogics-of-presence-or-absenceʼ (2.0 Vs. 1.0 respectively), we are left instead on the porous 
borders or the wobbly membrane (under erasure) of a vast vibratory différance; a haunt that 
cannot land us anywhere+anytime cleanly. This is the threat and the opportunity of the so-
called “new media” that operate on the other side of the projected ends of the previously 
dominant industrial apparatus of television. Seemingly empirical or accidental examples such 
as this confront us with an irresolvable double-border or Derridean double-bind that cannot be 
seen cleanly from one side or another but forces us to witnesslxxvi any one side of a border as 
unable to bend over and take up (aufhebung) or master the difference of the other side (a sort 
of ʻboxʼ or Escheresque space where the inside of one is the outside of the otherʼs inside, as 
we keep on flipping undecidably between). In a sort of quantum decisional act we are forced 
to interpretatively choose one rule of law or another, but in choosing are fully-faced with the 
haunted other side of the other-law un-chosen, that we cannot simply leap over to and 
become as if through our freely-chosen performative self-motivating dis-position: the act is in 
one place and the other, yet in neither place and at once.  
 
4.3 Of isʼs, ands & ats: or of copulae that cannot copulate 
 
If tele-techno-communications (or a tele-techné-tactile-teleology) are still be seen or 
conceived as the transferal of some present-to-itself lived energy or the renewal of an energy 
coded or put into suspended animation at one side and later revived untouched at the other, 
the immersion within the event of the lived experience and transferred out into a global re-
presentation, would seem to bring the representation and truth close and immanently 
together. Far then from this 2.0 conception of media being a threat to the border territories of 
the ends of television (as Merin and Gauntlett proffer), these wishful-ends that are seen within 
these new media spaces are in fact deepened and complicated as their ideological roots 
thrust further into the ʻseeming-soilʼ of a notional self-presence. If such reading of apparently 
empowered immersion (as 2.0 lived event that we could compare to Rheingoldʼs empowered 
bottom-up temporary gathering of smart mobs) is read as correct, then the ends of television 
will not have too much concern in stretching their borders to accommodate or incorporate (if 
not perhaps a more problematically indigestive psychoanalytic introjection?) this living of the 
event from the experiential ʻground floorʼ end.  
If however this positioning is more problematic and that a dispersal of energy (rather 
than a transferral) through an indigestive introjection takes place, through as I have argued a 
fundamental division-of-stages (evidenced by the need to apply a prosthetic compass effect) 
or a différance-of-stages, then the ends of television and the continuing humanist project may 
be stuck with some quite sticky indigestible matter within the desired cleanliness of the body 
proper, as such ʻbordersʼ may have some further (i.e. not lesser) breachings to contend with. 
The ends may still be yet to come but they are haunting with yet more excess or uncontrolled 
energy and this constitutes an excess that cannot be re-machined or honed away. Perhaps 
instead we should recognize (and without sublime pathos) and if only glimpsed a little, that we 
are attending here to the wheel of a rather uncontrollable différance engine? And that we are 
not driving any closer to the end(s)… 
…for such projected end(s) are always moving (away) with every seeming step.  	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ii These differences can also be conceptualized along the lines of ʻpushʼ and ʻpullʼ models of distribution 
(if one can subtract, for a moment, the stage-frames that we are discussing). A younger demographic is 
tending not to watch traditional broadcast ʻpushʼ media, but is interacting with provided media in ways 
that cannot be calculated via traditional methodologies. “Media” are being ʻpulledʼ via online 
communities (that do not quite follow the traditional model of the semantic play of fandom) that again 
threaten the idea of a convenient border or frame around a media object. iii	  This means national or centripetal socio-political authorities as well as media corporations. Obviously 
media corporations continue to crop up, to develop and to thrive within these spaces (facebook, google, 
news corporation, Microsoft, Yahoo etc.), but their existence far more precarious as competing models 
(based on pull, rather than push as discussed above) continue to develop. Where television previously 
was a relatively unified space, cyberspace offers many different methods of interaction that any reader 
knows will change out of all recognition within the next five years. No doubt the listed companies will still 
be providing developed versions of existing products, but they will be joined by other companies and 
other forms of space: such otherness is much less predictable than the development of televisual 
genres between 1970-1975. 
iv Sherry Turkle makes similar points about the use of new media spaces in ʻLife on Screen: Identity in 
the Age of the Internetʼ and ʻThe Second Self: Computers and the Human Spiritʼ. 
v Gauntlett finds this position (of the authoritative or ʻmetaʼ “theorist”) itself a little problematic and 
perhaps something equally bygone and thus equally to jettison, as well as the current inadequacy of the 
theories themselves. It is at issue here then that media theorists tend (hopefully soon to be in the past-
tense of a sort of museum plaque reading “tended”) to use a complex language that distances itself form 
the ordinary lived and the everyday living experiences of their students or pedagogic subjects. Along 
with the outmoded frameworks there is then an outmoded linguistic complexity or distance that are also 
now being outmoded by their studentʼs immanent practices. The media 2.0 scholar should then actively 
and performatively begin to distance themselves from this avant-garde theory that “screen” theorists 
perhaps “best” (or worst) tended to embody. This second part of the 2.0 issue with 1.0 is not however 
convincingly explained and as an existential ʻethicʼ of classroom comportment, seems a little clumsily 
glued-on (or sutured?) and is ʻvoicedʼ in a rather disconcerting manifesto tone and as some initiating rule 
from someone painting themselves into a position to set rules in play (performative bootstrapping 
without adequate explanatory framework). One gets the nagging feeling that one is reading the 
declaration of independence! 
vi This independent calling of the discipline by the same name reminds us of the independent invention 
of calculus by both Newton and Leibniz. The independent coming to the same conclusions, in a similar 
fashion to these latter parties with their calculus, makes the call all the more resonant to our possibly 
pre-2.0 ears. 
vii These 1.0 apparatuses do not just study or sit innocently above their object counterparts but just as 
reflexively power-knowledgably (Foucault) partake as much as their reflexive 2.0 replacements. This 
immanently-placed drive of 1.0 conceptions can no longer however immanently secure a productive 
berth, as the harbor (or containing infrastructure) has mutated and re-shaped itself. The machines they 
also reflect upon/within (as an externalizing exhaust focused back into the drive shaft) must find new 
immanently-placed power-knowledge machines and here 2.0 finds itself in better shape to moor itself. 
There has however been a deepening of the (always-already) immanent relationship which more or less 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
maps what George Soros (in ʻThe Theory of Reflexivityʼ) has stated about predictions within financial 
markets and which leaders of the discipline such as Henry Jenkins seem well aware of in hooking up 
their disciplinary regimes up to the institutions that they are studying (his influential book ʻConvergenceʼ 
is full of examples where the MIT Comparative Media Studies department that he heads helped to 
conceptualize issues along with television stations his students were studying). That is to say, overtly, 
that a more reflexive and embedded or performative relation is forming between the media academic 
optic and what it looks at: reflecting upon the changes that very reflection is helping to master. 
viii In ʻMedia, Gender and Identity: An Introductionʼ, Gauntlett  ix	  Or “rewires”. For as we will see (and as I study in more detail another context) Gauntlett must retrofit 
Butlerʼs concept of performative (and its Derridean questioning of the performative as an essentially 
different category to the constative and so giving it a free-floating flavour that Butler never heself 
“intended”)	  
x In a study of videogames **** theorizes identity as a form of open or hyper identity, just as a hypertext 
is a form of open-text. Thus he theorizes that we do not, any longer, have ʻfinalʼ identities but dip in and 
out and morph and change. This ties in to many theories of what have been termed ʻportfolioʼ or the 
reflexive identities (as theorized by Giddens) that we are soon to look at. 
xi We will see later the complications of the diegetic divide that complicates issues of the textual border, 
but also of any sense of narrative trajectory in the traditional sense of the word. Rather than simply 
expanding the notion of diegesis (as Murray is famously apt to optimistically and programmatically –i.e. 
in the days of the dreams of ʻvirtual realityʼ- predicts in ʻHamlet on the Holodeckʼ), diegesis itself needs 
to be questioned as a personhood local restricted economic (Bataille) paradigm. Any sense of 
expanding a diegetic spatial-trajectory cannot wish away the undecidables that will always-already come 
back to haunt it. This was already so before, but becoming much more so (as I will argue) now and later. 
xii To the extent to which such statements can be cleanly cleaved apart from the performatives that they 
take their conceptual distinctions from, as we will later see. 
xiii The pre-reflexive subject does not apparently take a stand on the choices available for its being-in-
the-world. By receiving a series of fixed codes-of-conduct or life programming, the 1.0 being (and its 
media)…..delete? As doesnʼt flow from specific point here? 
xiv Simply put, for now, but different to a Foucauldian power-knowledge (pouvoir-savoir): a, for example, 
ʻnational interestʼ is always-already performatively performed within any avowedly constative constitution 
of the other, no matter how distinct the optic seems to be in relation to what is (out-there) viewed. We 
are not dealing with matters of astronomy. This graphic economy should remind us of ʻwritingʼ  in the 
Derridean sense (i.e. not in the empirical local sense of phonetic writing) of that which does not make 
contact (as in phonetic interiority) with what it “refers” to. A graphic economy then is a little like a 
Bataillean general economy in that undecidability and excess are foregrounded, rather than hidden 
behind the veil of a constative objectivity. xv	  While reporters face the camera all the time and seem to address the viewer directly, it is obvious 
(obviously) that there is no “you” being spoken to in the present-tense but a “he/she” in the third-person. 
The second-person present-tense is of course an interpelletive-effect that is tightly striven for, but also 
kept within a sober distance (and of course sometimes mistaken by certain viewers outside of the 
code!). Nevertheless, sometimes television is forced into the mode of a sort of direct-address to injured 
parties that demands the performative ʻdoingʼ of the first to second person address (rather than third-
person) that is the apology. The performative speech act “we apologize for any upset” that the (normally 
hidden) station makes is framed or stems from a position seemingly entirely apart from flow of the 
programming but nevertheless forms a sort of tacit admittance that a performative was inherently 
contained within the constative that was the original offence itself (hence a certain necessity to carve 
itself off as a singularity).	  xvi	  And that this should also be seen as the difficult (as in the sense of questionable) concept of bias. 
Such an external view of viewpoint, does not adequately encapsulate the involvement of any constitution 
of the object. Such a viewpoint is never a ʻviewʼ but an involvement that breaks-ground instead of merely 
mis-mapping it in a disagreeable fashion. In a fashion similar to the Nietzschean unconcealment of the 
ʻwill-to-knowledgeʼ as a disguised ʻwill-to-powerʼ and the Heideggerian embodiedness of ʻbeing-in-the-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
worldʼ as opposed some Cartesian visitation by an evil demon merely offering misshapen images, this 
involvement is performative within highly embodied formats. 
xvii This fetishisation of the first-person reaches its acme in Gauntlettʼs book Web.Studies, which 
critiques the use of overly theoretical and difficult language. In speaking to a different audience Gauntlett 
believes one must (should) succumb to their lived language. This co-requisition itself would need further 
unpacking. 
xviii become famous totem-phrase 
xix This ʻfinallyʼ is often couched as the return on a higher scale to a sort of super responsive ʻcampfire 
closed-oralityʼ (as, for example, a BBC executive producer spoke of interactive storytelling at a session 
at the now defunct Dublin campus of the MIT-Medialab Europe). Within a Rousseuan scattering, writing 
brought in a system of rules to a once closed-community, that although taking us forward, stole away a 
primacy of contact. Now with the advent of such sophisticated and multimedia-rich technologies (that we 
are seemingly catching glimpses of), there is a return brewing, to this oral-closedness (McLuhan, Ong, 
etc.). It is the ultimate communications-based aufhebung. 
xx i.e. pre-reflexive third-person constative inactive 
xxi Just as there were expansive ʻhappeningsʼ in the late 1960ʼs in New York and recently the famously 
transitory flashmobs (that burst upon the world and ideally leave little in terms of an archival trace), lately 
new media artists have begun playing with the media-world interfaces such as ʻaugmented reality 
gamesʼ. Here instead of the game being merely ʻscreen-basedʼ, players interact in real-3D landscapes 
(shopping centers, etc.) to fulfill tasks set via mobile communications technologies. Here again the 
division between ʻdiegesisʼ and a supposed ʻextra-diegesisʼ (i.e. the so-called real world) are thrown into 
some difficulty. See McGonigal (2003) as well as her website (avantgame.com) for some interesting 
writing and reflections on her own practice within this growing field.  
xxii Of course there is a remaining issue here of the possibility of still having our narrative cake and yet 
also eating it interactively. For ʻHamletʼ is a famously very tightly controlled Shakespearean tragedy 
whose many pieces fit together to form an archetypal Aristotelian fine dramatic whole. Being-on-the-
stage as a Hamlet ourselves inevitably sets up something of a dynamic conflict between meta-narration 
and our own movements within its now supposedly loosened ambit. These difficulties of freedom-and-
control within the possibility of interactive narrative spaces (and where this is perhaps a somewhat 
classical contradiction in terms) has been explored convincingly by Meyer in an impressive essay titled 
ʻDramatic Narrative in Virtual Realityʼ (in Biocca 1997). Interactive narrative (of the virtual reality variety) 
has since the 90ʼs however become something of a lost cause, which is partly the result of the 
recognition of some these narrative difficulties, rather than some sticky issues with mere technological 
mimesis. 
xxiii to use the sous-rature suspicions of inverted commas and somewhat to support Gauntlettʼs points 
about ʻactiveʼ audiences never receiving a univocal “message” (but this was also quite common, it must 
be said, within traditional 1.0 readings such as A Bakhtin/de Certeau inspired Fiske, Iser, Fish, Ang, 
Jenkins, Barker and many others besides). 
xxiv “Play” should be read here as an undecidable term to divide the linear ʻplayʼ (as in screenplay or 
theatrical play) from the pluri-dimensional non-linear ʻplayʼ that moves from being a ʻtextʼ to an 
interactively mobile ʻprocessʼ that places a “/” within “screen/play”. 
xxv Another quite important problem with such first-person conceptualisations (and one which does not 
form the nub of our own difference but which informs it within a neighbourly critique of a self-
encapsulated “idealism”) is that they tend to ignore or thrust aside the continuing (and perhaps better 
operating) social soil that they form a part of. By arguing for ʻplayʼ (with gender identity say) Gauntlett 
tends to elide the continuing power of ʻthe socialʼ (which can certainly survive the advent of new media: 
for this is hardly a revolution, in the Marxist sense) and hands power symbolically down to a self-
motivating monad. 
xxvi The division between process and technique here is also malleable and mobile. A ʻprocess of flexible 
identityʼ would be something that is mapped or organically comes to pass, whereas a ʻtechnique of 
flexible identityʼ would operate on a more reflexive level (as Soros says for economic reflexivity models 
that point out a performative relation in relation to a seeming constative reading of the market) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
xxvii Again we should recognize here that the discipline of “Media Studies” does not sit above its object in 
any truly objective manner but is very clearly an integral part of the social sphere that it “comments” on a 
part of. Here George Sorosʼ points about the relationship of the speculative optic on market movements 
(in his essay on reflexivity) should be taken in reflecting on the place of media studies within its 
surrounding social tissue.  No matter how ʻconstativeʼ it seems, it is very much performatively involved in 
the very thing it thinks it takes a distance from. Again we find echoes to Foucaultʼs power-knowledge 
compound concept. Here we should listen carefully to Giddensʼ point below and begin to think of its 
relation to media studies. 
xxviii Some would call this stage of modernity ʻempowermentʼ, instead of being at the call of something 
notionally ʻpriorʼ to oneʼs intimate interests, but this would be to mistake an individual response to 
something more intimately tied up with a surrounding social eco-system. ʻEmpowermentʼ (taking oneʼs 
existence into oneʼs own space) is not a product of the individual grasping now what is theirs, but a 
response to a change within the constitution of the social soil that only perhaps allows for such 
empowerment because it fits with the work of the surrounding ecology or environment (a sort of mobile-
umwelt). Empowerment is not to be thought along such intimate lines. 
xxix ʻHow To Do Things With Wordsʼ is itself a performative tranformation of the conceptual framework 
that develops it while simultaneously laying out its framework. Rather than starting off with a finished 
article that could be outlined within a preface or introduction, Austin starts seemingly confident with one 
definition (the clean opposition of constative/performative) and ends with quite another ( the 
establishment of illocutionary/perlocutionary forces instead). The Harvard lecture series is itself then a 
witnessing of the performative problems in grappling for a solution to certain practices or games of 
ordinary language, rather than a simple constative outlining of some atemporal finalized framework that 
would exist from the opening of the work. While Derrida celebrates such undecidable-uncertainty in the 
work of Austin, Searle wishes to consign this remaining play to the father of speech actsʼ (Austinʼs) 
untimely death (that if he had lived the book would now have been safely closed around the framework). 
As we will see, Derrida feeds from some of these contradictions and difficulties and reworks the 
performative in a much more dis-seminatory fashion. 
xxx Searle, Speech Acts xxxi	  Thus fulfilling on the level of discourse, the Cartesian ground of the self-certain subject sure of its 
own enclosed ground (and thus akin to Husserlʼs expression versus citational indication, see note 
below)	  
xxxii Reword: perhaps ʻambivalent something or other?ʼ 
xxxiii Here we foreshadow the legal aspect of intentionality as it hooks up to the perlocutionary and 
especially the acts of illocutionary force, thus forming an evidential nexus for the judging of the exact 
location and the exact palpability of an act (for the force of emotion is integral to the legality of the act, 
which must not be a recitation or be induced by any ʻfictionalʼ elements or contexts, otherwise, surely, 
many radio, stage and screen actors would be on trial for bigamy along with those who had certain other 
complications). An illocutionary force is the intentional substance that should be present in the saying of 
“I do” (instead of reading from a book or under gun-point as a form of quotation or citation) would seem 
to be the unshakeable ground of the western episteme. Our case-study in section 3 will however point to 
how new media augment a fracture of the ability to position of this intentionality (ʻaugmentʼ as this 
fracture is nothing new or introduced by the entrance of new media upon the scene, but a symptom and 
amplification of something always-already there) and show that we are dealing with something more 
than simply the written transcription of a live-intentionality transported and unwrapped on the other side 
of the planet. In short, we cannot divide here our intention from the law that surrounds us. It must also 
be stated that Derrida points out (working to point to instabilities in the other direction) that the context is 
something than can destabilize the act also and this inherent destabilization of context will form the 
context of our own depiction of the problems of intentional communication across spacetime (without 
also being able to retreat behind the safety of a border where the performative would be able to reign 
within a sovereign security). Fill in later and maybe bring up into the main body of the text?… 
xxxiv The allusion or reference here to atomic physics is purposeful, as later we will see through the work 
of Arkady Plotnitsky that there are analogous difficulties of separating spaces that should be recognized 
within the theoretical optic, rather than elided (an elision which we believe Gauntlett to be perpetuating) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  xxxv	  Judith Butler (or “Judy” to some who would wish for a totemic leader) has contested the idea that 
she has contributed to the formation of a field of enquiry that could be labeled ʻgender studiesʼ for 
“gender-sex” for her is not something that is entirely performative (in this traditional sense or in the 
sense that Gauntlett would understand it). We have visited this subject in relation to Gauntlettʼs use of 
Butlerʼs two books (the misunderstood ʻGender Troubleʼ and the corrective of such misunderstandings 
ʻBodies That Matterʼ) in a previous paper (Richards, 2009). xxxvi	   Derrida explores this analogous issue of Husserlʼs thorny difficulty of keeping the sign of 
ʻindicationʼ away from the sign of ʻexpressionʼ in his ʻSpeech and Phenomenaʼ. This, as in the present 
case surrounding “John Langshaw Austin”, concerns the very issue that would wish the depositional, 
supposedly self-present-to-itself, signing (again as verb-ing) to be altogether done with itself (done with 
itself, as in eliding the truth of its re-citation-al-re-flection) as some infrastructurally decided conventional 
signage. For in not being able to be done with the helping-hand of the sign in signifying something to 
oneself, one finds oneself external to oneʼs own notional enclosure at any possible moment of self-
reflection.	  
xxxvii Freud and first-person primordial id-filled (human-) animality as opposed to a late-arriving super-ego 
which would be the pre-programmed steps of a code (of conduct), whether that be godly or societal. 
Derrida looks at the relationship between the history of concepts of beastiality and sovereignty in his last 
seminar course titled “The Beast and the Sovereign” (which both live outside the law, or here with a 
Freudian refraction, through the domain of the ego) 
xxxviii And why the Harvard Lectures “How To Do Things With Words” are often an allegory of this very 
unsustainability. 
xxxix Translates as ʻunder-erasureʼ which originates from Heideggerʼs use of ʻbeingʼ with a cross through 
it, so that it can still be read underneath. It can still be read-underneath (even though it is very clearly 
crossed-out) because we cannot simply be rid of a concept but must still operate within its gravity and its 
pull, even as we simultaneously question its solidity. Derrida borrows (early on in his career he 
sometimes employed this explicit crossing-out, but later this became a more linguistic/rhetorical strategy 
of mis-appropriation) this technique to carry on using a concept, but this time keeping the contradictions 
as a “productive” aspect of his argument. His writing is famously full of borrowed misrepre-rented or 
internally-fissured concepts that speak of (as concerning their possible-positionality) undecidability. 
xl One must hear within the reception of this word a difference to the conventional sexual inseminational 
meaning (the conventional linear information theoretical laden sense) of disseminating a message. To 
clarify, Derrida famously makes a false etymology of male semen and seme (as in semantic) to question 
the phallogocentric connotation of planting meaning or seed upon a fertile and receptive ground. 
Dissemination points out that messages (like copulative sperm) can be scattered un-cashed rather than 
linearly sent/received and rather than simply having polysemic potential in opposition to this uni-
semiosis (still operating within an horizon of receptive-singular meaning) are always divided, 
undecidable and undeliverable in potential, as we will go on to point out within the ongoing argument. 
This will be revisited in note…. 
xli This is our own neologism. Iteration, as Derrida clearly points out, is different to repetition or citation. 
Although it calls attention to ʻlikewiseʼ element it contains within itself its difference to ʻitselfʼ (in terms of 
the repetition of an identity) a differing within the repetition: in the repetition something is lost and 
something gained. Thus iteration already contains the difference of performative/constative negating the 
need for the addition of the word ʻperformativeʼ as a portmanteau modification. I include ʻperformativeʼ 
here as a pedagogic re-pointing, however which this footnote hopefully causes to recognise. 
xlii Even now, within the azure polymorphous sky of this new media age, we are not at all to be done with 
the ʻideology-of-the-signatureʼ. For in this hypertextual, hyper-identity age, we would still seem to need 
the anchor of the standing-reserve of the intentionality of a subject that is evidenced within the signature 
mark(s) that “they” leave: the trace or the remainder known as the signature, perhaps bears a signature 
testament, so to speak, of a remaining marker of identity that is necessary still on the supposed other 
end of televisionʼs domination (for ʻafter televisionʼs ageʼ, we are supposed to be done with identity, in 
the tense of a constant). Again, we could perhaps tease-out further some of these contradictions. 
xliii To return to the mythopoetics of a privately-powerful language: Derrida uses a thought experiment 
(SEC, p.**) to illustrate the necessity of a third party to any first-second party communication. Two-
person language…Though this section is necessarily ʻdryʼ (to use his encryption from much later in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
essay), it connects to the inherently exotic mystifications of the many of the most seemingly mundane of 
telecommunications that we will be exploring under-cover in section 3.*: namely that we can, through 
these teletechnological apparatuses, supposedly communicate a clean intention over a border without 
any loss of personal income. We will find ourselves, within our message, unembalmed over this 
spacetime that will seemingly defy borders.  
xliv For a comparable deconstructive reading of Austinʼs ʻconstativeʼ/ʼperformativeʼ opposition in 
ʻSignature Event Contextʼ see Derridaʼs ʻSpeech and Phenomenaʼ for a deconstructive reading of 
Husserlʼs opposition of the indicative ʻexternalʼ colloquational sign verses the expressive ʻinternalʼ or 
soliloquational sign. Again the heartland of the interior is forever haunted by the externalʼs errant 
alienness which is not of itself the master. 
xlv Similarly to Wittgensteinʼs famous pronouncements on the impossibility of a private language, 
Derridaʼs ʻpostcardʼ can be a seen also then as a reply to the problem of the impossibility of ʻthe 
enveloped letterʼ (both then in Lacanʼs sense of the ʻagencyʼ of a letter that always reaches –like the 
repressedʼs return- its destination, but more importantly here, in answer to Wittgensteinʼs point about the 
impossibility of a private language or of a mythological  letter that could not be opened, of a letter that is 
also not the alternate model of some super-available postcard). If a postcard always bears the trace of 
the subject along the contour of a contextualisable outside (in answer to a letterʼs possible loss-of-
reception of its unopened or lost interiority; unopened by a receiver and thus lacking a receiver), it would 
not for all that make of the subject someone in privation of privacy (but also does not return the subject 
to the philosophically comfortable pre-linguistic realm prior to Wittgensteinʼs helpful linguitic turn). The 
image of the postcard instead provides a strong illustrative counter metaphor where what is written 
along the outside (as opposed to locked in privacy, in the space of my own experiential monadically 
echoing qualia, for example) is not a guaranteeable availability to a context external my “borders”, but a 
message that, though not mine to hide or dispense with when asked to open by the law-of-context, can 
be lost , disseminated (see note v) and one that does not belong to me anyway, in any case. This 
metaphor then can do with some further useful conceptual teasing out and connected back to the 
problem of the archival depositing performative in relation to the postcard and the system that allows for 
its circulation within a info-technological system. We must also not forget that the metaphoric image of 
the Derridaʼs postcard allows for the further image of a contextual power that Wittgensteinʼs own ʻletter-
metaphorʼ does not quite as well iron(-ise) out. 
xlvi Of course this is a domaining and domineering energy behind many forms of nationalism (without 
wishing to first-person ʻblameʼ nationalism on any parties that individually feel or embark on its 
presence, for these are also no-doubt overdetermined also by fluctuations in the market, to say the 
least). An internal Kristevian abjection is born witness to where the outside is cast aside by some 
internal recognition of a lack of clean internality. There is a significant amount of overlap here that bears 
witness to a significant overlap between Kristeva and Derrida that De Nooy investigates in her book that 
compares their differences and similarities on the problems of difference. 
xlvii And here we would refer to the importance of what Derrida calls the counter-signature. Such a 
counter-signature cannot be expunged from any notional information pipe-line (no matter how pre-
prosthetic it might seem) and so forms the irresolvable difficulty or law(s) of context that always already 
prevents the signature from being itself (even if is seems to be received without countersignature-and 
often here a joint-context is elided and read as some purity of signature-transport). This irresolvable 
presence  of the counter-signature forms behind the case-study within section 3.* below.	  
xlviii But is the norm untroubled if it awaits a reply (or a counter-signature) to the question that the 
pregnant waiting poses? As Butler will argue, the expectations one implicitly makes (of the usual 
seemingly empirical functioning) of the hospital institution (that provides the care of pre-birth and birth, 
as in information, support) supports also a whole significatory norming operation that polices anything 
that might fall outside its bounds. Though one may (socio-psychically) agree with it before one enters its 
physico-geometric parameters, this does not stop it, for all that, providing many possibilities of 
undecidability that (as Butlerʼs next quote points out) harries it as it simultaneously supports: answers 
will have to be forced and baptism will not await a naming that comes later. 
xlix Butler points out a connection here with Althusserʼs theory of interpellation, hailing and his famous 
“hey, you there” function of ideology and how it transforms individuals into subjects (here read supposed 
naturalised constative into a performative). This interpellation however does not require an agency of 
authority to bring out the ʻbelongingʼ in us, but takes place through all sorts of physical (rather than 
psychical) movements. Institutions, as Foucault would go on to examine, operate in geometric ways. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
l ʻDigital McLuhanʼ by Paul Levinson. As a former student of McLuhan (just as with Searle and Austin), 
Levinson wishes that his old mentor were still around to see his prophesy fulfilled. For Levinson believes 
the technology of Internet communication to have fulfilled the reproduction of close-clean orality on the 
level of technological reproduction. Just as Walter J. Ong sees the speech model (what is ideologically 
wrapped-up within its mythological cloth) as what the technological model should strive for (and indeed 
in the end, to get there), so Levinson believes transportation of the self to the other (and vice versa) is 
what the internet (or its children) will bring. Levinson proves then to be very un-Levinasian in that the 
latter (Levinas) saw an ethic of distance (instead of proximity/totality) and acceptance of alterity/infinity 
(an an-arche) that Levinson would wish to vanquish. Interestingly Ong does tackle Derridaʼs problem 
with the logocentric speech teleological model, but does not provide a very solid case. Indeed he is 
forced to (actively?) misinterpret some of Derridaʼs difficulties with McLuhan to make him fit more easily. 
li The fascinating (for social-historical reasons) and rather quaintly-McLuhanesque book called “4000 
years of Television” (1946) sees within the newly emerging medium of television, the closing of a 
teleological journey that began (and depicted somewhat cutely) within caves where certain young bucks 
began to break out of their parentʼs oral traditions and work to create primitive communications that 
could store up intentions for later consumption. All work over the last 4000 years has been heading 
towards televisionʼs magnetic north, and we are the very lucky beneficiaries of this tele-work and its (end 
of history) conclusion. In a more complex argument (that works to uncover these seemingly innocent 
democratic ideologies of televisual ʻworld-shrinkingʼ communication) Dienst (1994) unpacks some of the 
(ideologically positioned) historical voices (for example Arnheim, Vertov, Sartre, etc.) that were framing 
the place for televisionʼs job around its time of launching. 
lii As a fellow-traveler of our own Mr. Underwood (who we are soon to discuss), John Perry Barlow has 
moved from the concerns of his own piece of American land and his freedom to protect and survive on 
it, to a defense of the freedom of a space he calls cyberspace. In his impassioned individualistic 
“Declaration of Independence of Cyberspaceʼ (a declaration that would obviously call for a reading very 
similar to Derridaʼs of the performative act that was the original -and as he points out rather apoeretically 
voiced “we-the-undersigned”- ʻDeclaration of Independenceʼ that it somewhat citationally echoes (and 
we should, of course, be getting used to this tendency of performatives to inevitably find a need to 
strongly echo, if not to downright copy and paste as do the best of plagiarists, previous seemingly clean-
handed performatives)…	  liii	  This space remains a very Cartesian or Euclidian space, even as J.P. Barlow wishes to free it from 
any situated responsibility that could have a law or compound placed around it. In fact Barlow tethers 
this azure-free space to a conceptality of ground at-the-very-unique-moment he wishes to till it and turn 
it over for other purposes…	  
liv Some hunters of a Thoreauan manly-philosophical persuasion have argued for the situatedness of 
hunting and concomitantly that hunting via a distant or remote prosthesis is an inherent crime against 
the essence or ontology of the hunt. James A. Swan, for example, argues that one must be within and 
amongst it all and have the beastʼs blood and sticky-smell upon oneʼs hands and that this wet or gluey 
experience of ʻbeing-within-the-hunting-worldʼ is quite another story to something that takes place over 
clinically-cowardly distance of some distancing (perhaps voyeuristic-masturbatory) information pipeline. 
In an ESPN sports entry specifically against Mr. Underwoodʼs cyber-connective proposal that we are 
here looking into, he argues for an essence of co-presence with the quarry. Similarly, in a series of 
books concerned with being-in-nature (ʻPower of Placeʼ, ʻIn Defense of Huntingʼ, etc.), he argues that 
there is a path toward spirit and the sacred that makes all hunters feel compassion for the hunted (right 
before they kill them) p.35. In such a worldview the co-presence of the animal prevents hunting from 
becoming some sort of a  ʻsitting stale supermarketʼ. This obvious replay of the ʻbeing-thereʼ argument 
itself could do with some further unpacking as ʻbeing-there-withʼ (mit-da-sein) is perhaps not as entirely 
situated as it often supposes itself to be. 
lv This, of course, is a further replay of the supposed neo-liberal accomplishment of free market 
dispositions that would seem to operate (within this ideological formation) above historical-contextual 
determination, which we will talk about later in the study 
lvi To remind ourselves of our argument earlier, media studies 2.0 replaces industrialized-final identities 
with free identities located now at the ground-floor level of the individual. While 1.0 media were 
concerned mainly with solidifying the audience identity within a larger (read national) framework, the 
inhabitant of 2.0 media spaces (the many spaces mainly of the internet) match more with identities that 
are temporary and are not based around industrial but post-industrial identity formations. We must keep 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in view here that there is a significant quantity of overlap within what 2.0 asks of its media that repeats 
1.0ʼs presuppositions. 
lvii Television is of course struggling to maintain some links with these other ends and to contain within 
its somewhat stretched body-proper these aspects that threaten it also (obvious examples but mention a 
few such as youtube shows, website followups/hookups, time-shifted offsited iplayers, etc.). 
lviii Advertisements for computers, software and mobile phones are filled with smiling images of 
technologies and global village de-babelising connections that naturally favour a free market democratic 
ground. This again demonstrates the power of such seemingly innocent (that is to say disembodied) 
neoliberal ideology that powers, so to speak, the ideology of the internet “revolution”. 
lix We will ask later whether such teletechnological prosthetic extensions also extend a supplementary 
secondarity to the preceding professed state of immediacy itself that is the situated rifle that so concerns 
traditional “analogue” hunters. If a secondary stage originating away from the intimate action robs the 
scene of its intimate naked truth, why is this disdainful distance in itself so threatening to the truthful and 
unitary intimacy?  Perhaps, later, once this secondarity spooks this primal scene (that comes to 
supposedly divide the intimate intimacy of the hunter from the hunted) whereupon the primacy itself 
comes to be seen to be operating under some spectral division or erasure, a division that was already 
there from the very outset of the intimacy. The point may be that the threat from errant outside (from 
these teletechnologies that separate) was always already intimately-present before the dishonest or 
soiling extension came upon the scene: that the rifle itself was already a teletechnological extension, 
and hardly a primary nature. Similarly, and more central to our technological concerns here, televisionʼs 
homeland defenses and ring-fencing of the homelandʼs borders does not just come under threat from 
some foreseen contra-community ʻendsʼ (those people who lose the locale of community by crossing 
borders via the internet), but this apocalyptically foreseen after-end brings forth (or retroactivates) an 
end that was there from the beginning, always already. Much work within Media Studies 2.0 and the 
former 1.0, often unknowingly, goes to bury this unity between such a seeming natural “beginning” and 
the ends projected outward. A deconstructive study would aim to further unpick some of these 
paradoxes that cannot help but crop up, like unwanted weeds, within various corners and margins of 
these fields of research.  
lx We can easily foresee a Nintendo Wii control that would utilize an accelerometer that would transport 
information across the internet to the servo-operated gun at the other end. Such bringing-close of the 
operations at one end would, no doubt, serve to secure a strong subjective sense of ʻbeing-thereʼ, but 
would not in any way solve the problem of legality and borders that we are investigating here: immersion 
can never simply be about “immersion”. Also the sense of loss is perhaps a little apocalyptically 
mourned or celebrated, for just because an operand might gain a sense of ʻinvolvementʼ, does not, for 
all that, mean that this equates to a loss a la suture theory (see Richards 2009, Cybercultures argument) 
lxi Just as accelerometers and digital compasses within the above note have joined with other similar 
indexico-semiotic environmedia in revolutionizing the mode-of-engagement with generic interfaces such 
as games or augmented-reality-engines (and seemingly “immersing” subjects now into object-spaces, 
making those of a Baudrillardian and Virilioan persuasion worry about a seeming implosion or loss of 
cleanliness of in subject-object confrontations), so we should revisit (lately –and certainly- affected by 
techno-interlaced-networks-of-engagement) what it is to be in contact with a physical object that we 
might get to touch or have a haptic-tactile relationship with. Formerly (for the techno-hunting saboteur 
Swan et al and Virilio for different reasons) mounting a head after a hunt might have meant something 
solid had taken place, but is there not something equally as virtual involved here, even before an 
extended prosthetic might lead to subjectʼs victory over an object. We can forsee a situation (very soon) 
where an augmented technology would allow a HUD (heads-up-display) to watch a formula one car go 
past us that is not even going past a camera placed (and transmitting to us) on the other side of the 
world (i.e. no cameras will be needed to transmit a telepresence, in the old fashioned sense). For here 
an gps sensor placed onboard the car would send a message to a satellite that locates its local xyz-
object>xyz-spatial geometry that will then allow a subject (placed in a mapped position) to pin itself to a 
place on the circuit reconstructed on the HUD (which can of course be “cut” to another position on the 
circuit once the local-xyz-1 has passed – and here the subject will be the judge of how fast they can 
move to a local-xyz-2 and then local-xyz-3 before losing the suture-location-sensation: no doubt the 
fluidity-of-locations in such as space will, at some point, provide “the fun of it” (as Welles said of certain 
chicanes within narratives) to be able to pivot along a static xyz to be able to gain the sense of watching 
the object pass ʻhereʼ but that has passed ʻthereʼ at the same time. Thus a live-timespace is transmitted 
to another timespace that obeys the same object-coordinates, as if the subjectʼs coordinates were glued. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
At such a point the resources of being-there will outstrip being-there (though a nostalgia for the ʻnatureʼ 
of the stairs will no doubt lead to a disposal of the culture of the lift, to use Virilioʼs example), but will we 
be able to say whether we have lost or gained anything that was previously not virtual. The question of 
the virtual and where technics sullies purity, is not an easy question to have answered. 
lxii Again the notion of ʻintentionalityʼ (Brentano, Husserl, etc.) has come under question for quite some 
time now from thinkers such as Heidegger and Derrida. The supposed transportation of intentional 
content over a network connection does nothing to reinvigorate this doxa of some transposal of intimacy 
and could do with much more unpacking than it often does (surprising in an age where the individual 
agency is coming under increasing suspicion from thinkers such as Rheingold). Intentionality is however 
tending to be transposed from an individual to a collective level with everything that supports it left 
relatively intact. The notion of the oikos or the housing is taken from being housed, as it were within an 
individual frame, to being housed within a more distributive, but nevertheless totalized economy. 
lxiii For though often the currently experienced state of  ʻpresent-dayʼ technology seems always badly 
measured for the wrapping up of the mythological once ʻlivedʼ event, there is always the dream of 
rekindling a distance-coming-nearer, that technology will, upon this day, match up to what the 
communicating “father” (for there is a relation between patriarchy and the ideology of the arché; the law-
of-the-unified-first) required when setting off the child-of-communication along its way. Techné will finally 
contain and set free the encryptions, codes or magic words of the once lived origin. On such a date, the 
child will be nothing ʻotherʼ than the father unembalmed and reborn. And at this point: the future as 
ʻuncertaintyʼ, dies. Here then we have a politics of futurity that desires of futurity calculation (and which 
we will revisit in our table in section 4.1). While this would deserve another argument, teletechnologies, 
within their very remit, presuppose a swallowing of temporality as uncertainty. Our entire argument here 
however is that these technologies, in their currently evolving form, far from offering a furtherance of this 
patri-archal father-law (as we could coin it) contain seeds that do not bridge or inseminate such fatherly 
intention but undercut or dis-seminate it. This is no digital McLuhanesque domain. 
lxiv The pilot in his ship being the platonic-Cartesian ideal of the deux ex machina or the soul and the 
body returning eventually to the realm of the ideal. Within this conception, the body is either itself dirty or 
a thing that discolors some notional prior purity, or a husk to finally be cast off without essentially 
affecting the essence which would live-on or remain (this lately has been updated with fantasies of 
downloading “the self” into a computer without any difference to the thing called consciousness, by for 
example futurologists such as Ray Kurzweil: one should perhaps visit Merleau-Ponty to question again 
the mind-body split that this desire presupposes). This then is the still Christian ideal that, reacting 
specifically against a strain of German Idealism still apparent, Nietzsche and later Heidegger brought 
into question by bringing the temporality and materiality of the body-mind coupling back to haunt this 
Platonic ideal. Many idealists within the new media space, however post-human they imagine 
themselves to be, tend to live-off this very humanist idea of a living-on. 
lxv Or of certain types of animal: for we are bound to ask where we draw the all so important demarcation 
lines in a country where some are classed as vermin or multitudinous or some others as fair game or 
others to be ruled out of season, etc. 
lxvi Incidentally Descartesʼ certain ground of the psycheʼs self-certitude was problematised at the time by 
…… who replaced the cogito of the cogito ergo sum with a new arché of moto ergo sum as equally 
impervious to philosophical prosecution of what runs the vessel (replacing the captain driving the ship, 
with the ship driving the captain). Here we find strong echoes in Heideggerʼs concentration on the 
physical institution as writing the movements of the occupant that proved to be so influential in the work 
of Althusser, Foucault and Bourdieu, as they would later admit.  
lxvii Edmund Locard, as one of the fathers of modern forensic science, pointed out through his notion of 
his famous ʻexchange principleʼ that any act leaves traces. Thus soil from a scene can be recovered 
later on the shoes of a suspect and by examining the trace of this exchange, a prior occupation or act 
can be deduced. Any excavation-of-the-act, in the usual archaeological sense, classically demands the 
traces of presence evidenced though some indexical guarantors. Again we come upon the politics of the 
signature and the law-of-the-arché-father. 
lxviii This neologism ʻtropo-graphicʼ or ʻtropo-logicalʼ (as opposed to topographic or topological) is not 
playing fast and loose or to merely perhaps have some play with language, as a trope involves the 
transport of one figure (a proper figure) by another figure (an improper figure) that reflects our issue here 
with transportation. The classical trope, that is metaphor for example, is a form of transport from a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
proper place or point of departure to an improper place of destination (science would famously wish to 
do without the mud of metaphor, even though it is always composited within the very soil of their 
“explanation”). Here we are questioning concerning what exactly a ʻspaceʼ is when borders are involved. 
We will later underline that this is not an argument for remaining ʻwithinʼ or retreating ʻbehindʼ borders, 
but that the visibility of the difficulty of these borders only brings out what was always-already within the 
border, in a very Kristevian sense (abjection, etc.). 
lxix For, as we are beginning to see, there is here an insoluble politics-of-the-decision, which is faced with 
the bottomless (ʻmise-en-abymeʼ, rather than ʻmise-en-sceneʼ) decision of deciding what the status of 
the animal is. Linguistics is thrown onto the horns of a dilemma as we are not carving up an object-with-
properties but are faced with a reflection of our own linguistic categories as we look through the optic of 
this fly-by-wire apparatus that we have here been investigating. The translation of what is foreign, as 
Derrida demonstrated in ʻOf Grammatologyʼ, is not the transportation of any clean signified across a 
border (through an exchange of signifiers: “cat for chat”) but a question of the existence of the signified 
as a stable origin in any sense. As we will see later, in looking through this apparatus to spot the status 
of this ʻcatʼ we are faced with something not entirely dissimilar to the famous physics thought experiment 
concerning Schrödingerʼs famously slippery “cat” (that is wanted, though not available, as decidedly 
dead or alive). 
lxx This is where a courtʼs jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction is decided by the court itself. This 
self-sealing can get jurisdiction out of some sticky situations… 
 
lxxi Territory is to ground as law is to nature, as writing is to speech and as techné is to physis. Ground 
then is indivisible and an underlay upon which a law is written upon or imposed some time afterward. 
For ground (the what) to be divided from territory (the who) the ground must hold something that territory 
cannot saturate or colonise (the primary holds back any secondary totality) 
lxxii In an interview in ʻLimited Inc.ʼ Derrida points out that undecidability is very different to indeterminacy 
(which opponents often accuse him of deploying) as there is always a dynamic between places or 
positions within a field of meaning. Meaning cannot just be located nowhere or anywhere. 
lxxiii This undecidablity, again, is not something that is transported or parachuted in within any imposed 
reading, but is an irresolvable part of the text itself long before such a reading is undertaken or 
demonstrated. However much one might wish to avoid or tuck away such weeds or contradictions, the 
teleology of some space where all decisions are final will never come to pass. Here we should at least 
begin to unpick some Rousseauan or McLuhanesque dreams of de-babelised, de-bounded global 
villages. 
lxxiv For the use of the language of a progressive 2.0 inherently continues the identity of a program 
through a determinate iterative coupling of a sameness-within-difference, just as Photoshop 1.0 shares 
a strong identity with Photoshop 8.0. This is why 3.0 would not be a desire for this particular study, not 
through some wish to surpass an identity but as a questioning of such identity much earlier than its 
forming. 
lxxv This is Derridaʼs neologistic pun on ontology explored most fully in his ʻSpecters of Marxʼ. Hauntology 
in relation to videogames was explored in this authorʼs chapter titled ʻPresence-Play: The Hauntology of 
the Computer Gameʼ where positions were shown not to be ontological singularities but positions 
intimately haunted by other time-space positions (différance). 
lxxvi i.e. not from some unsituated, decisionless view from nowhere that some science of the media would 
be able to unpack. 
